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NOTE 
“Equal Exposure” Brews Frustration for 
Employees: Court Filters Personal Comfort 
Doctrine Through Workers’ Compensation 
Amendments 
Johme v. St. John’s Mercy Healthcare, 366 S.W.3d 504 (Mo. 2012) (en 
banc). 
BREANNA HANCE* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In 2005, the Missouri General Assembly comprehensively reformed the 
state’s workers’ compensation system.1  To achieve reform, the legislature 
enacted revisions to nearly thirty sections of Missouri’s workers’ compensa-
tion statute.2  Among other significant amendments was a revision to Mis-
souri Revised Statutes section 287.020.3(2),3 which defines whether an injury 
is deemed to “arise out of and in the course of employment” thereby qualify-
ing for workers’ compensation.4  The statute, which previously required an 
  
  *  B.A. Political Science, University of Missouri, 2011; B.A. Psychology, 
University of Missouri, 2011; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School of Law, 
2014; Associate Member, Missouri Law Review, 2012-2013.  I am sincerely grateful 
to my advisor, Dean Rafael Gely, for his assistance on this Note.  I thank Ashley 
Cross and the 2012-2013 Missouri Law Review staff for their dedication and thought-
fulness during the editing process.  This Note is dedicated to the biggest role models 
in my life, my parents and siblings, for their continued love and support. 
 1. S.B. 1 & 130, 93rd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2005). 
 2. See The Workers’ Compensation Law, MO. REV. STAT. §§ 287.010-287.811 
(Supp. 2011); Mo. Alliance for Retired Ams. v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus. Relations, 
277 S.W.3d 670, 674 (Mo. 2009) (en banc) (“Senate Bills Nos. 1 and 130 amended 30 
sections of chapter 287, RSMo 2000, the Missouri’s workers’ compensation law . . . 
.”). 
 3. Miller v. Mo. Highway & Transp. Comm’n, 287 S.W.3d 671, 673 (Mo. 
2009) (en banc).  
 4. MO. REV. STAT. § 287.020.3(2) (“An injury shall be deemed to arise out of 
and in the course of employment only if:  (a) [i]t is reasonably apparent, upon consid-
eration of all the circumstances, that the accident is the prevailing factor in causing 
the injure; and (b) [i]t does not come from a hazard or risk unrelated to the employ-
ment to which workers would have been equally exposed outside of and unrelated to 
the employment in normal nonemployment life.”). 
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employee to show that his or her employment was a substantial factor in 
causing the injury, now requires an employee to show that the accident was 
the prevailing factor in causing the injury.5  By limiting the scope of section 
287.020.3(2), the legislature called into question many of the common law 
doctrines previously employed by judges to determine whether an injury was 
compensable under workers’ compensation.6   
In a recent case, Johme v. St. John’s Mercy Healthcare,7 the Supreme 
Court of Missouri greatly narrowed the judicially-created personal comfort 
doctrine.8  The doctrine states that an employee’s acts tending to his or her 
personal comfort are incidental to employment and thereby covered under 
workers’ compensation.9  In Johme, the plaintiff was injured at work while 
making coffee in the office kitchen.10  Although she was ministering to a 
personal comfort, the court reversed the Labor and Industrial Relations 
Commission’s award of workers’ compensation benefits.11  Addressing the 
“arising out of and in the course of employment” requirement, the court held 
that in order to recover under workers’ compensation, an employee must 
show the injury was caused by a work-related risk that the employee was not 
equally exposed to outside of employment.12   
This Note will examine the status of the “arising out of and in the course 
of employment” requirement after Johme.  Part II begins with an analysis of 
the facts and holding of Johme.  Next, Part III synthesizes the background of 
workers’ compensation laws in Missouri, including the establishment of the 
workers’ compensation system, the development of the personal comfort 
doctrine, the 2005 statutory revisions, and two post-2005 cases interpreting 
the changes.  Part IV outlines the court’s rationale in deciding Johme.  Fi-
nally, Part V discusses the impact of Johme on the “arising out of and in the 
course of employment” requirement.  This Note argues that: (1) Johme abro-
gated the use of the personal comfort doctrine to satisfy the “arising out of 
and in the course of employment” requirement, consistent with the 2005 
statutory revisions;13 (2) Johme clarified the standard of proof for future 
claimants to show an injury arose out of and in the course of employment;14 
and (3) the court’s rule is susceptible to criticisms for departing from the 
original goals of workers’ compensation.15 
  
 5. See infra note 135 and accompanying text. 
 6. See 29 MISSOURI PRACTICE:  WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW AND PRACTICE 
§ 2.7 (2d ed. 2012). 
 7. 366 S.W.3d 504 (Mo. 2012) (en banc). 
 8. See infra Part V.A. 
 9. Kunce v. Junge Baking Co., 432 S.W.2d 602, 609 (Mo. App. S.D. 1968). 
 10. Johme, 366 S.W.3d at 506. 
 11. Id. at 512. 
 12. Id. at 511. 
 13. See infra at Part V.A. 
 14. See infra at Part V.B. 
 15. See infra at Part V.C. 
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II.  FACTS AND HOLDING 
Sandy Johme worked as a billing representative for St. John’s Mercy 
Healthcare when the accident that gave rise to her workers’ compensation 
claim took place.16  Johme’s duties as a billing representative took place in an 
office building and included “desk work,” such as typing charges into a com-
puter.17  Located roughly thirty steps away from Johme’s desk was an office 
kitchen, where St. John’s provided a coffee station for use by all employees.18   
On the morning of June 23, 2008, Johme went to the kitchen to fill up 
her coffee.19  Because she took the last cup of coffee from the pot, she began 
brewing a new pot, as was the customary practice in the office.20  As she fin-
ished making the coffee, Johme “turned and then went on the side of her shoe 
and went down.”21  At the time of the accident, Johme was wearing sandals 
“with a thick heel and a flat bottom, with a one-inch thick sole.”22  Johme 
pulled herself up using a counter and realized she could not walk.23  A co-
worker came into the kitchen and retrieved Johme’s manager.24   Johme was 
taken by ambulance to the hospital, where she was treated for a fractured 
pelvis.25 
Following the fall, Johme and her manager completed an injury report.26  
Johme reported that she “was standing at [the] coffee pot [and] when [she] 
turned to walk back to [her] desk, [she] felt [her] shoe suddenly on the 
floor.”27  Johme’s manager stated in the report that Johme was “making cof-
fee in the kitchen, turned to put [coffee] grounds in [the] trash, twisted [her] 
ankle and fell off [her] shoe, fell backwards and landed on [the] floor.”28  
Emergency room records indicate “Johme reported [tripping] at work because 
  
 16. Johme, 366 S.W.3d at 505. 
 17. Brief of Employee/Respondent Sandy Johme at 5, Johme, 366 S.W.3d 504 
(No. SC 92113), 2011 WL 3584283, at *5; Brief of Appellant/Employer St. John’s 
Mercy Healthcare at 5, Johme, 366 S.W.3d 504 (No. SC 92113), 2011 WL 3136644, 
at *5. 
 18. Johme, 366 S.W.3d at 506. 
 19. Brief of Employee/Respondent, supra note 17, at *5. 
 20. Johme, 366 S.W.3d at 506. 
 21. Brief of Appellant/Employer, supra note 17, at *6.  Johme testified that she 
did not remember exactly what she was doing when was injured.  Johme, 366 S.W.3d 
at 506 n.2.  She said she could have been turning to go back to her desk or turning to 
go to the counter.  Id. 
 22. Johme, 366 S.W.3d at 506.  
 23. Brief of Employee/Respondent, supra note 17, at *7. 
 24. Johme, 366 S.W.3d at 506. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. (alteration in original). 
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of the shoes she was wearing.”29  At the time of the fall, the kitchen’s floor 
was not irregular or hazardous.30 
Johme filed a claim for benefits under workers’ compensation.31  Mis-
souri Revised Statutes section 287.120 provides that: 
Every employer subject to the provisions of this chapter shall be li-
able, irrespective of negligence, to furnish compensation under the 
provisions of this chapter for personal injury or death of the em-
ployee by accident arising out of and in the course of the em-
ployee's employment.  Any employee of such employer shall not 
be liable for any injury or death for which compensation is recov-
erable under this chapter and every employer and employees of 
such employer shall be released from all other liability whatsoever, 
whether to the employee or any other person[.]32 
The definitions contained in section 287.020 explain: 
 
(2) An injury shall be deemed to arise out of and in the course of 
the employment only if: 
(a) It is reasonably apparent, upon consideration of all the circum-
stances, that the accident is the prevailing factor in causing the in-
jury; and 
(b) It does not come from a hazard or risk unrelated to the em-
ployment to which workers would have been equally exposed out-
side of and unrelated to the employment in normal nonemployment 
life.33 
Johme testified that she did not make coffee at home.34  The administra-
tive law judge (ALJ) denied Johme’s claim for benefits, finding: (1) she was 
not performing work duties at the time she fell, and (2) she was “equally ex-
posed to the same hazard or risk” of “just [falling]” in her normal, non-
employment life.35 
The Labor and Industrial Relations Commission (Commission) reversed 
the ALJ’s denial of benefits.36  The Commission’s decision first discussed the 
history of workers’ compensation and the effect of the legislature’s 2005 
  
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. The Workers’ Compensation Law, MO. REV. STAT. § 287.120.1 (Supp. 
2011). 
 33. Id. § 287.020.3(2). 
 34. Johme, 366 S.W.3d at 507. 
 35. Id. at 506-07. 
 36. Id. at 507. 
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amendments to the workers’ compensation statutes.37   Specifically, the 
Commission noted that revised section 287.020.3(2) abrogates prior case law 
interpretations of the phrase “arising out of and in the course of employ-
ment,”38 citing the legislature’s enactment of section 287.020.10, which 
states: 
In applying the provisions of this chapter, it is the intent of the leg-
islature to reject and abrogate earlier case law interpretations on 
the meaning of or definition of “accident”, “occupational disease”, 
“arising out of”, and “in the course of the employment” to include, 
but not be limited to, holdings in: Bennett v. Columbia Health Care 
and Rehabilitation, 80 S.W.3d 524 (Mo. App. W.D. 2002); Kasl v. 
Bristol Care, Inc., 984 S.W.2d 852 (Mo. banc 1999); and Drewes 
v. TWA, 984 S.W.2d 512 (Mo. banc 1999) and all cases citing, in-
terpreting, applying, or following those cases.39 
Using the Pile test,40 the Commission determined Johme’s claim was 
compensable under workers’ compensation by applying the personal comfort 
doctrine to the “arising out of and in the course of employment” standards of 
section 287.020.3(2).41  The Commission held that making coffee was “inci-
dental to and related to” Johme’s employment under the personal comfort 
doctrine, and therefore it was unnecessary to proceed to part two of the Pile 
analysis to determine whether she would have been “equally exposed” to the 
risk outside of her employment.42  The Commission awarded Johme disability 
payments and past medical expenses.43 
St. John’s appealed the Commission’s decision, arguing the conclusion 
was not based on sufficient, competent evidence to satisfy the “arising out of 
and in the course of employment” requirement of section 287.020.3(2).44  The 
  
 37. Id. at 507-08.  The 2005 legislative revisions are more thoroughly discussed 
herein.  See infra at Part III.C. 
 38. Johme, 366 S.W.3d at 508. 
 39. The Workers’ Compensation Law, MO. REV. STAT. § 287.020.10 (Supp. 
2011). 
 40. Pile v. Lake Reg’l Health Sys., 321 S.W.3d 463 (Mo. App. S.D. 2010).  The 
Pile court employed a two part test to determine whether an injury arose out of and in 
the course of employment:  (1) “determine whether the hazard or risk is related or 
unrelated to the employment[,]” and (2) “if the hazard or risk is unrelated to employ-
ment . . . determine whether the claimant is equally exposed to this hazard or risk in 
normal, non-employment life.”  Id. at 467.  Under the test, if “the activity giving rise 
to the accident and injury is integral to the performance of a worker’s job, the risk . . . 
is related to employment.”  Id.  
 41. Johme, 366 S.W.3d at 508. 
 42. Id. at 508-09 
 43. Id. at 509. 
 44. Id. 
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Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District proposed reversing the award of 
compensation, but instead transferred the case (post opinion) to the Supreme 
Court of Missouri “because of the general interest of this question and the 
failure to find Pile persuasive.”45 
Using a de novo standard of review, the Supreme Court of Missouri held 
that Johme’s fall while making coffee in the office kitchen was not com-
pensable under the Missouri workers’ compensation statutes because it was 
not an injury that “arose out of and in the course of employment” under sec-
tion 287.020.3(2).46  The court reasoned that (1) the “cause of her injury – 
turning and twisting her ankle and falling off her shoe – [did not have] a 
causal connection to her work activity other than the fact that it occurred in 
her office’s kitchen while she was making coffee,” and (2) Johme presented 
insufficient evidence to show she was subject to a lesser risk of this type of 
injury in her normal, non-employment life.47  
III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Workers’ compensation was established as a bargain between employers 
and employees and was codified into Missouri statutory law nearly a century 
ago.48  The workers’ compensation statutes49 provide employees with com-
pensation for “personal injury or death of the employee by accident arising 
out of and in the course of the employee’s employment.”50  Prior to 2005, 
courts applied common law doctrines such as the “personal comfort doctrine” 
to claims to determine whether an injury “arose out of and in the course of 
employment.”51  In 2005, the Missouri General Assembly revised multiple 
sections of the workers’ compensation chapter, making significant changes to 
the system, particularly to the burden of proof and the “arising out of and in 
  
 45. Id. at 509 n.10; Johme v. St. John’s Mercy Healthcare, No. ED 96497, 2011 
WL 5056300, at *5 (Mo. App. E.D. Oct. 25, 2011), rev’d, Johme, 366 S.W.3d 504.   
 46. Johme, 366 S.W.3d at 509-12. 
 47. Id. at 511. 
 48. See State ex rel. Elsas v. Mo. Workmen’s Comp. Comm’n, 2 S.W.2d 796, 
798 (Mo. 1928) (“On November 2, 1926, at the biennial general election in Missouri, 
the electorate voted upon the Missouri Workmen’s Compensation Law of 1925, 
which had been duly passed by the Legislature and approved by the Governor”); State 
ex rel. Chang v. Ely, 26 S.W.3d 214, 216 (Mo. App. W.D. 2000) (“The Missouri 
Workers’ Compensation Act . . . became effective in 1926”). 
 49. See The Workers’ Compensation Law, MO. REV. STAT. §§ 287.010-287.811 
(Supp. 2011).  
 50. Id. § 287.120.1; see also De May v. Liberty Foundry Co., 37 S.W.2d 640, 
644 (Mo. 1931). 
 51. Johme, 366 S.W.3d at 507-08. 
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the course of employment” requirement.52  Prior to Johme, several cases in-
terpreted the revisions.53 
The following subparts focus on the “arising out of and in the course of 
employment” requirement.  This Part first reviews the establishment of work-
ers’ compensation in Missouri.  Next, it introduces the personal comfort doc-
trine as a tool for determining whether an injury arises out of and in the 
course of employment.  Subsequently, this Part outlines the 2005 statutory 
revisions to Missouri’s chapter on workers’ compensation.  Finally, this Part 
concludes with an analysis of two cases leading to Johme that applied the 
“arising out of and in the course of” requirement following the 2005 amend-
ments.   
A.  Establishment of the Workers’ Compensation System 
The Missouri legislature passed the state’s first workers’ compensation 
law in 1925.54  Prior to the establishment of workers’ compensation, employ-
ees could sue their employers under common law negligence for injuries re-
lated to workplace accidents.55  Under common law negligence, however, 
employees were often barred from recovery by the fellow servant rule,56 as-
sumption of risk,57 and/or contributory negligence,58 among other defenses.59  
Thus, an injured worker could “recover for work-related injuries only if he or 
  
 52. See S.B. 1 & 130, 93rd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2005). 
 53. See, e.g., Miller v. Mo. Highway & Transp. Comm’n, 287 S.W.3d 671 (Mo. 
2009) (en banc); Pile v. Lake Reg’l Health Sys., 321 S.W.3d 463 (Mo. App. S.D. 
2010). 
 54. The Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1925 Mo. Laws 375; see also Bass v. 
Nat’l Super Mkts., Inc., 911 S.W.2d 617, 619 (Mo. 1995) (en banc) (“In 1925, Mis-
souri’s legislature adopted its first workmen’s compensation law, 1925 Mo. Laws 
375, directing that ‘[a]ll of the provisions of this act shall be liberally construed with a 
view to the public welfare.’” (citations omitted)).  While the original workers’ com-
pensation system was elective for employers, amendments to the statute in 1974 and 
1990 made the law compulsory for all employers with five or more employees and all 
construction industry employers who have one or more employees. I MISSOURI 
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW § 1.4 (3d ed. 2004). 
 55. Bass, 911 S.W.2d at 619. 
 56. A common-law doctrine “holding that an employer is not liable for an em-
ployee’s injuries caused by a negligent coworker.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 693 
(9th ed. 2009). 
 57. “The act or an instance of a prospective plaintiff’s taking on the risk of loss, 
injury, or damage.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 143 (9th ed. 2009). 
 58. “A plaintiff’s own negligence that played a part in causing the plaintiff’s 
injury and that is significant enough (in a few jurisdictions) to bar the plaintiff from 
recovering damages.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1133 (9th ed. 2009).  
 59. Bass, 911 S.W.2d at 619; see also Amanda Yoder, Note, Resurrection of a 
Dead Remedy: Bringing Common Law Negligence Back into Employment Law, 75 
MO. L. REV. 1093, 1097 (2010). 
7
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she could prove the accident resulted solely from the employer’s negli-
gence.”60  Studies estimated that of the 50,000 workplace injuries reported in 
Missouri in 1921, seventy-five percent of workers received no compensation 
for those injuries.61  Additionally, of the 25,000 workers killed or injured in 
industrial accidents in 1921, only twenty percent of their families received 
compensation.62 
Responding to employees’ lack of redress for workplace injuries, and 
based on the increasing number of industrial accidents,63 the Missouri Gen-
eral Assembly passed the state’s first workers’ compensation law in 1925.64  
The Workmen’s Compensation Act was approved by public referendum and 
implemented in 1926.65  The fundamental purpose of workers’ compensation 
was to “place upon industry the losses sustained by employees resulting from 
injuries arising out of and in the course of employment.”66  The goal was to 
“provide simple and nontechnical compensation” for injured employees.67   
The workers’ compensation chapter within Missouri’s Revised Statutes 
provides a no-fault based form of compensation for injured workers.68  The 
system is based on the underlying concept of insurance69 and creates a statu-
tory contractual relationship between employers and employees.70  Under 
workers’ compensation, employers must compensate their employees for any 
personal injury or death that arises out of and in the course of employment, 
regardless of whether the employer was negligent.71  Rather than merely sup-
  
 60. Bass, 911 S.W.2d at 619. 
 61. Todd v. Goostree, 493 S.W.2d 411, 416 n.2 (Mo. App. W.D. 1973). 
 62. Id. 
 63. Bass, 911 S.W.2d at 619. 
 64. The Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1925 Mo. Laws 375. 
 65. State ex rel. Elsas v. Mo. Workmen’s Comp. Comm’n, 2 S.W.2d 796, 797 
(Mo. 1928). 
 66. Wolfgeher v. Wagner Cartage Serv., Inc., 646 S.W.2d 781, 783 (Mo. 1983). 
 67. Bethel v. Sunlight Janitor Serv., 551 S.W.2d 616, 618 (Mo. 1977) (en banc). 
 68. Akers v. Warson Garden Apartments, 961 S.W.2d 50, 56 (Mo. 1998), over-
ruled by Hampton v. Big Boy Steel Erection, 121 S.W.3d 220 (Mo. 2003). 
 69. De May v. Liberty Foundry Co., 37 S.W.2d 640, 645 (Mo. 1931). 
 70. Bass v. Nat’l Super Mkts., Inc., 911 S.W.2d 617, 619 (Mo. 1995) (en banc). 
 71. De May, 37 S.W.2d at 644 (quoting Workmen’s Compensation Act, § 3, 
1927 Mo. Laws. 492).  The 1927 statute stated “[i]f both employer and employee 
have elected to accept the provisions of this act, the employer shall be liable irrespec-
tive of negligence, to furnish compensation under the provisions of this act for per-
sonal injury or death of the employee by accident arising out of and in the course of 
his employment, and shall be released from all other liability therefor whatsoever, 
whether to the employee or any other person.”  1927 Mo. Laws 492.  The current 
statute states “[e]very employer . . . shall be liable, irrespective of negligence, to fur-
nish compensation under the provisions of this chapter for personal injury or death of 
the employee by accident arising out of and in the course of the employee’s employ-
ment . . . and every employer and employees of such employer shall be released from 
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plementing common law remedies, workers’ compensation completely re-
placed them.72   
Workers’ compensation is often viewed as a bargain between employers 
and employees.73  Under the bargain, employees “surrender[] the right to sue 
their employers at common law in exchange for lower but certain compensa-
tion . . . in all . . . accidental work-related injuries.”74  Conversely, employers 
surrender their common law defenses and accept absolute liability in ex-
change for protection from paying out full common law damages.75  Accord-
ing to Chief Justice Teitelman of the Supreme Court of Missouri, “the essen-
tial [components] of the workers’ compensation bargain . . . are (1) the cer-
tainty of ‘a sure and speedy means of compensation for injuries suffered in 
the course of employment’ and, (2) the availability of compensation irrespec-
tive of fault.”76 
As the statute indicates, not all workplace injuries are covered under 
workers’ compensation.77  Whether an employee is entitled to recover bene-
fits is decided “on a case-by-case basis depending on individual facts.”78  The 
burden of proof falls on the workers’ compensation claimant seeking recov-
ery.79  Once the claimant establishes an accident, he or she must show the 
injury “has arisen out of and in the course of employment.”80   
While Missouri courts often refer to “arising out of and in the course of 
employment” as one element of a workers’ compensation claim, the condition 
actually involves two separate and distinct tests: “arising out of” and “in the 
course of.”81  “Arising out of” employment denotes a “causal connection 
  
all other liability whatsoever[.]”  The Workers’ Compensation Law, MO. REV. STAT. 
§ 287.020.10 (Supp. 2011). 
 72. Gunnett v. Girardier Bldg. & Realty Co., 70 S.W.3d 632, 636 (Mo. App. 
E.D. 2002). 
 73. Mo. Alliance for Retired Ams. v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus. Relations, 277 
S.W.3d 670, 675 (Mo. 2009) (en banc). 
 74. Id. 
 75. Gunnett, 70 S.W.3d at 636. 
 76. Mo. Alliance for Retired Ams., 277 S.W.3d at 684 (Teitelman, C.J., dissent-
ing) (quoting St. Lawrence v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 8 S.W.3d 143, 149 (Mo. 
App. E.D. 1999)). 
 77. The Workers’ Compensation Law, MO. REV. STAT. § 287.020.10 (Supp. 
2011); see Wheaton v. Reiser Co., 419 S.W.2d 497, 499 (Mo. App. W.D. 1967). 
 78. Mo. Alliance for Retired Ams., 277 S.W.3d at 680  (holding “workers ex-
cluded . . . by the narrower definitions of ‘accident’ and ‘injury’ [in the 2005 amend-
ments] have a right to bring suit under common law”). 
 79. Johme v. St. John’s Mercy Healthcare, 366 S.W.3d 504, 509 (Mo. 2012) (en 
banc).  
 80. MO. REV. STAT. § 287.020; Johme, 366 S.W.3d at 509. 
 81. Abel ex rel. Abel v. Mike Russell’s Standard Serv., 924 S.W.2d 502, 503 
(Mo. 1996) (en banc). 
9
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between the [work] conditions . . . and the employee’s injury.”82  “In the 
course of” employment refers to the time, place, and manner of the acci-
dent.83  The claimant must show his or her injury meets both tests in order to 
recover compensation.84  
Although the legislature has attempted to define this requirement,85 there 
is no precise formula for determining whether an injury arises out of and in 
the course of employment.86  Under the original workers’ compensation stat-
ute, commissioners and judges were instructed to construe the act’s provi-
sions liberally in favor of compensation.87  Missouri case law reveals a con-
tinuing struggle by courts to reconcile the statute’s general definitions with an 
endless variety of factual situations where employees’ injuries are loosely 
related to the employment duties or premises.88  Accordingly, courts have 
adopted a variety of doctrines and rules to apply the “arising out of and in the 
course of employment” requirement.89  Prior to 2005, judges employed these 
doctrines in combination with the statutory limits to determine whether a 
claimant’s injury was compensable under workers’ compensation.90 
  
 82. Id. (“An accident arises out of the employment relationship ‘when there is a 
causal connection between the conditions under which the work is required to be 
performed and the resulting injury.’” (quoting Kloppenburg v. Queen Size Shoes, 
Inc., 704 S.W.2d 234, 236 (Mo. 1986) (en banc), overruled by Hampton v. Big Boy 
Steel Erection, 121 S.W.3d 220 (Mo. 2003) (en banc))). 
 83. Id. (“An injury occurs ‘in the course of’ employment ‘if the injury occurs 
within the period of employment at a place where the employee reasonably may be 
fulfilling the duties of employment.’” (quoting Shinn v. General Binding Corp., 789 
S.W.2d 230, 232 (Mo. App. E.D. 1990))). 
 84. Id. at 504. 
 85. MO. REV. STAT. § 287.020.3(2). 
 86. Blatt v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 413 S.W.2d 533, 535 (Mo. App. E.D. 1967). 
 87. MO. REV. STAT. § 287.800 (2000) (“All of the provisions of this chapter shall 
be liberally construed with a view to the public welfare”) (amended 2005); see also 
Miller v. Mo. Highway & Transp. Comm’n, 287 S.W.3d 671, 673 (Mo. 2009) (en 
banc). 
 88. Garrett v. Indus. Comm’n., 600 S.W.2d 516, 519 (Mo. App. W.D. 1980). 
 89. See Kunce v. Junge Baking Co., 432 S.W.2d 602, 608 (Mo. App. S.D. 1968) 
(“Courts have hopefully devised and variably apply a farrago of special doctrines and 
rules in an effort to cope with the endless variety of factual situations which continu-
ally deluge them in workmen’s compensation cases.”).  See generally 29 MISSOURI 
PRACTICE:  WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 6, § 2.3 (citing 
such doctrines as the “personal comfort doctrine,” the “assault doctrine,” the “going 
and coming doctrine,” the “extension of premises doctrine,” and the “street hazard 
doctrine”). 
 90. Johme v. St. John’s Mercy Healthcare, 366 S.W.3d 504, 507-08 (Mo. 2012) 
(en banc). 
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B.  The “Personal Comfort” Doctrine 
The personal comfort doctrine is one of several common law doctrines 
developed by the courts to apply the “arising out of and in the course of em-
ployment” requirement to patterns of factual circumstances.91  To recover 
under the Missouri workers’ compensation statutes prior to 2005, a worker’s 
injury had to be “incidental” to his or her employment.92  The personal com-
fort doctrine states that certain unavoidable acts that minister to one’s per-
sonal comfort are considered “incidental” to his or her employment when 
committed at work.93  Activities that qualify as “ministering to one’s personal 
comfort” include “satisfying thirst and hunger,”94 using “toilet facilities,”95 
“preparing to begin or quit work[,]”96 “seeking warmth, shelter or fresh air,”97 
applying cosmetics,98 and returning to an assigned work area after a meal.99    
The rationale for allowing recovery under the personal comfort doctrine 
is that activities tending to one’s personal comfort benefit the employer indi-
rectly because they benefit the employee.100  Additionally, such activities 
allow employees to concentrate more efficiently on their duties.101  Because 
these acts advance the interests of the employer, the employee does not 
“thereby necessarily leave the course of employment” by ministering to 
them.102  Further, because activities ministering to personal comfort are 
  
 91. Kunce, 432 S.W.2d at 608-09. 
 92. MO. REV. STAT. § 287.020.3(1) (2000). 
 93. Drewes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 984 S.W.2d 512, 514 (Mo. 1999) (en 
banc), superseded by statute, The Workers’ Compensation Law, MO. REV. STAT. § 
287.020.10 (Supp. 2011); Bell v. Arthur’s Fashions, Inc., 858 S.W.2d 760, 763-64 
(Mo. App. E.D. 1993), overruled by Hampton v. Big Boy Steel Erection, 121 S.W.3d 
220 (Mo. 2003) (en banc); Moore v. St. Joe Lead Co., 817 S.W.2d 542, 543 (Mo. 
App. E.D. 1991); Kunce, 432 S.W.2d at 609. 
 94. Drewes, 984 S.W.2d at 514; Goetz v. J.D. Carson Co., 206 S.W.2d 530, 534 
(Mo. 1947); Ford v. Bi-State Dev. Agency, 677 S.W.2d 899, 902 (Mo. App. E.D. 
1984); Jones v. Bendix Corp., 407 S.W.2d 650, 653 (Mo. App. W.D. 1966). 
 95. Ford, 677 S.W.2d at 902; Schultz v. Moerschel Prods. Co., 142 S.W.2d 106, 
110 (Mo. App. W.D. 1940). 
 96. Thompson v. Otis Elevator Co., 324 S.W.2d 755, 758 (Mo. App. E.D. 1959). 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 759. 
 99. DeVille v. Hiland Dairy Co., 157 S.W.3d 284, 288 (Mo. App. S.D. 2005). 
 100. Cox v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 920 S.W.2d 534, 537 (Mo. 1996) (en banc). 
 101. Thompson, 324 S.W.2d at 759. 
 102. Id. at 758 (“[E]mployees who minister to their personal comfort, within the 
time and space limitations of their employment, do not thereby necessarily leave the 
course of their employment.”); Bybee v. Ozark Airlines, 706 S.W.2d 570, 573 (Mo. 
App. E.D. 1986) (“To satisfy the requirement that the employee’s injury occurred ‘in 
the course of’ her employment, it is only necessary to prove that the injury occurred 
within the period of employment at a place where the employee may reasonably be, 
while she is engaged in the furtherance of the employer’s business, or in some activity 
 
11
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within the nature of the employee’s duties, any injury causally connected to 
those activities is compensable.103  With the mere “incidental” standard prior 
to the 2005 amendments, Missouri courts used the personal comfort doctrine 
as a shortcut to assess both the “arising out of” employment standard and the 
“in the course of” employment standard.104   
One of Missouri’s earliest applications of the personal comfort doctrine 
was in 1930.105  In Jackson v. Euclid-Pine Investment Company, parents 
brought a claim for workers’ compensation after their son died from exposure 
to high levels of carbon monoxide while cleaning an automobile at work.106  
The employee worked nights as a general caretaker and night watchman for a 
garage.107  His duties involved cleaning cars, delivering cars to patrons, and 
moving cars within the garage.108  The employee was found dead one morn-
ing due to carbon monoxide poisoning.109  The court hypothesized that even 
if the man started the car within the garage to stay warm on the cold night, the 
injury still arose out of and in the course of employment, despite furthering 
his personal comfort.110 
The Supreme Court of Missouri employed the personal comfort doctrine 
as early as 1956.111  In Culberson v. Daniel Hamm Drayage Company, a trac-
tor-trailer loader ate a sandwich on his lunch break and laid down in the shade 
under his trailer, waiting for the other men to finish eating in a nearby bak-
ery.112  After several minutes, the loader fell asleep.113  Fifteen minutes later, 
the driver left the bakery and unknowingly ran over the sleeping man, causing 
his death.114  The court held the loader did not “abandon his employment” by 
nursing his personal needs for shade and sleep while on a lunch break, and 
  
incidental thereto.” (quoting Yaffe v. St. Louis Children’s Hosp., 648 S.W.2d 549, 
550-51 (Mo. App. E.D. 1982))). 
 103. James v. CPI Corp., 897 S.W.2d 92, 95 (Mo. App. E.D. 1995). 
 104. See Drewes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 984 S.W.2d 512, 514-15 (Mo. 
1999) (en banc), superseded by statute, The Workers’ Compensation Law, MO. REV. 
STAT. § 287.020.10 (Supp. 2011);  Cox, 920 S.W.2d at 537; James,  897 S.W.2d at 
95; Jones v. Bendix Corp., 407 S.W.2d 650, 652-53 (Mo. App. W.D. 1966); Thomp-
son, 324 S.W.2d at 758-59. 
 105. Jackson v. Euclid-Pine Inv. Co., 22 S.W.2d 849 (Mo. App. E.D. 1930). 
 106. Id. at 850. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 852. 
 111. Culberson v. Daniel Hamm Drayage Co., 286 S.W.2d 813, 817-18 (Mo. 
1956). 
 112. Id. at 815. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
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the claimant was entitled to recover under workers’ compensation because the 
injury arose out of and in the course of employment.115   
Several other recent Missouri cases demonstrate the courts’ use of the 
personal comfort doctrine.  In Jones v. Bendix Corporation, a chair collapsed 
when a woman sat down to drink coffee in the office cafeteria before her shift 
began.116  The court held that “satisfying [one’s] physical needs immediately 
prior to . . . work” in an office-provided cafeteria was incidental to employ-
ment because the activity was a mutual benefit to employer and employee, 
and the injury thus arose out of and in the course of employment under the 
personal comfort doctrine.117  Similarly, in DeVille v. Hiland Dairy Company, 
a worker stopped to talk to his fellow employees and injured his knee when 
turning to leave. 118  The employee was allowed recovery premised on the 
personal comfort doctrine, because the court classified the personal activity as 
being “incidental to employment.”119  Additionally, because of the personal 
comfort doctrine, an employee was entitled to recover under workers’ com-
pensation for injuries sustained when she tripped while walking to her em-
ployer’s break room to eat lunch.120 
For activities ministering to one’s personal comfort to sufficiently relate 
to employment, warranting coverage under workers’ compensation, the 
claimant must show:  
[1] a benefit inured to the employer, [2] the extent of the departure 
from one’s duties was not so great that an intent to temporarily 
abandon the job could be inferred, and [3] the method chosen to 
tend to one’s comfort was not so unusual or unreasonable that the 
conduct could not be considered an incident of the employ-
ment[.]121   
Prior to the legislature’s 2005 revisions to the workers’ compensation 
chapter, the personal comfort doctrine was a well-established tool used by 
courts to grant recovery under workers’ compensation.122  In 2005, however, 
the doctrine’s status was called into question.123  
  
 115. Id. at 818-19. 
 116. Jones v. Bendix Corp., 407 S.W.2d 650, 651 (Mo. App. W.D. 1966).  
 117. Id. at 652-53. 
 118. 157 S.W.3d 284, 285 (Mo. App. S.D. 2005). 
 119. Id. at 288. 
 120. Drewes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 984 S.W.2d 512, 514-15 (Mo. 1999) 
(en banc), superseded by statute, The Workers’ Compensation Law, MO. REV. STAT. 
§ 287.020.10 (Supp. 2011). 
 121. Johme v. St. John’s Mercy Healthcare, 366 S.W.3d 504, 507 n.7 (Mo. 2012) 
(en banc). 
 122. Cox v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 920 S.W.2d 534, 537 (Mo. 1996). 
 123. Johme, 366 S.W.3d at 507. 
13
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C.  2005 Legislative Amendments 
In 2005, the Missouri legislature revised the statutory chapter related to 
workers’ compensation in order to restrict the types of injuries compensable 
under the system.124  Governor Matt Blunt encouraged reform, fearing high 
workers’ compensation insurance rates would “drive businesses out of Mis-
souri.”125  Tom Deuschle, director of the Missouri Department of Labor and 
Industrial Relations, commented that the new system would reduce fraudulent 
claims.126  Other business leaders argued the system was too skewed in favor 
of workers and sought balance in the workers’ compensation system.127  The 
2005 revisions both mandated a different standard of review for workers’ 
compensation claims and provided further instruction on the “arising out of 
and in the course of employment” requirement.128  
The legislature’s revisions impacted the standard of review in at least 
two significant ways.  Prior to the amendments, judges and commissioners 
were instructed to construe the act’s provisions liberally in favor of compen-
sation.129  The statute now calls for strict construction of the workers’ com-
pensation provisions, rather than the prior, liberal construction.130  Addition-
ally, judges and commissioners are now instructed to “weigh the evidence 
impartially without giving a benefit to either party.”131  Consequently, em-
  
 124. Worker’s Compensation, 2005 Mo. Laws 907; see, e.g., Miller v. Mo. High-
way & Transp. Comm’n, 287 S.W.3d 671, 672-73 (Mo. 2009) (en banc).  The revised 
legislation did not include a legislative purpose.  See 2005 Mo. Laws 907.  Further, 
journals of the Missouri House and Senate record only motions and votes; no record 
of debate is made. The Legislative Process in Missouri, MO. HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES, http://www.house.mo.gov/content.aspx?info=/info/howbill.htm 
(last visited Feb. 7, 2013).  
 125. Heather J. Carlson, House Committee Approves Tougher Workers’ Comp 
Bill, SOUTHEAST MISSOURIAN, Feb. 25, 2005, http://news.google.com/newspapers 
?id=OqcfAAAAIBAJ&sjid=IdYEAAAAIBAJ&pg=3039,7303173&dq=missouri+%2
6+workers-compensation&hl=en; Blunt Signs Workers’ Compensation Reform into 
Law, ST. LOUIS BUS. J., Mar. 30, 2005, http://www.bizjournals.com 
/stlouis/stories/2005/03/28/daily44.html?jst=b_ln_hl. 
 126. Workers’ Compensation Changes Effective August 28th, KAN. CITY 
INFOZINE (Aug. 28, 2005), http://www.infozine.com/news/stories/op/storiesView 
/sid/9891/. 
 127. Michael Moroni, The Missouri Workers’ Compensation Legal Advisor Sys-
tem: Can It Be Resurrected Under the New Law?, 34 S. ILL. U. L.J. 117, 126 (2009). 
 128. See The Workers’ Compensation Law, MO. REV. STAT. §§ 287.800, 287.020 
(Supp. 2011). 
 129. MO. REV. STAT. § 287.800 (2000). 
 130. MO. REV. STAT. § 287.800 (Supp. 2011). 
 131. Id.  Previously, judges viewed evidence in favor of compensation.  Miller v. 
Mo. Highway & Transp. Comm’n, 287 S.W.3d 671, 673 (Mo. 2009) (en banc). 
14
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ployees now have a higher burden of proof in establishing a compensable 
injury.132 
In their revisions, the legislature also clarified the “arising out of and in 
the course of employment” requirement.133  The legislature narrowed the 
scope of injuries covered under the requirement by amending section 
287.020.3(2), which explains when an injury is deemed to arise out of and in 
the course of employment.134  The revised section 287.020.3(2) states: 
(2) An injury shall be deemed to arise out of and in the course of 
the employment only if: 
(a) It is reasonably apparent, upon consideration of all the circum-
stances, that the accident is the prevailing factor in causing the in-
jury; and 
(b) It does not come from a hazard or risk unrelated to the em-
ployment to which workers would have been equally exposed out-
side of and unrelated to the employment in normal nonemployment 
life.135 
The legislature also added a provision to the statute that rejects certain 
case law interpretations of the terms “accident”, “occupational disease”, 
“arising out of”, and “in the course of the employment.”136  The provision 
abrogates the meaning of these terms as held in Bennett v. Columbia Health 
Care and Rehabilitation,137 Kasl v. Bristol Care, Inc.,138 Drewes v. TWA,139 
  
 132. Leake v. City of Fulton, 316 S.W.3d 528, 532 (Mo. App. W.D. 2010). 
 133. See MO. REV. STAT. §§ 287.020.3, 287.020.10 (Supp. 2011). 
 134. Compare id. §287.020.3(2), with MO. REV. STAT. §287.020.3(2) (2000); see 
also Miller, 287 S.W.3d at 672-73.  
 135. MO. REV. STAT. §287.020.3(2) (Supp. 2011) (emphasis added).  The section 
previously stated that “[a]n injury shall be deemed to arise out of and in the course of 
the employment only if: (a) [i]t is reasonably apparent, upon consideration of all the 
circumstances, that the employment is a substantial factor in causing the injury; and 
(b) [i]t can be seen to have followed as a natural incident of the work; and (c) [i]t can 
be fairly traced to the employment as a proximate cause; and (d) [i]t does not come 
from a hazard or risk unrelated to the employment to which workers would have been 
equally exposed outside of and unrelated to the employment in normal nonemploy-
ment life.”  MO. REV. STAT. §287.020.3(2) (2000). 
 136. MO. REV. STAT. §287.020.10 (Supp. 2011). 
 137. 80 S.W.3d 524 (Mo. App. W.D. 2002), superseded by statute, The Workers’ 
Compensation Law, MO. REV. STAT. § 287.020.10 (Supp. 2011).  In Bennett, a 
nurse’s aid with a history of knee problems sought to recover under workers’ com-
pensation when she felt her knee pop twice at work, once when she walked around a 
patient’s bed and again when she carried linens up a flight of stairs.  Id. at 526.  The 
Western District interpreted “accident” broadly and stated that an injury did not have 
to be immediately preceded by a sudden fall or strain to be compensable; rather, an 
accident occurs if there is a mere “breakdown or a change in pathology.”  Id. at 529 
(quoting Winsor v. Lee Johnson Constr. Co., 950 S.W.2d 504, 509 (Mo. App. W.D. 
 
15
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and their progeny.140  Drewes directly discusses the terms “arising out of” and 
“in the course of” employment.141   
In Drewes v. TWA, a Trans World Airlines (TWA) reservation agent 
sought to recover under workers’ compensation after she fell and injured her 
ankle while walking across a break room with her lunch.142  The court noted 
an “injury must be incidental to and not independent of the relation of em-
ployer and employee” to arise out of employment.143  Applying the personal 
comfort doctrine, the court held the claimant’s injury arose out of employ-
ment because activities “attending to one’s personal comfort [(for example, 
eating lunch) are] incidental to employment.”144  Next, the court stated em-
ployees are in the course of employment “while engaged in or about the 
premises where their duties are being performed, or where their services re-
quire their presence as a part of such service.”145  The majority held 
“[a]ccidents in or about [an employer’s] premises, during a scheduled, unpaid 
lunch break, occur in the course of employment.”146  The court concluded 
Drewes’ injury was compensable under workers’ compensation.147 
Based on the foregoing legislative revisions, the Supreme Court of Mis-
souri held statutory “section 287.020.3(2) must control any determination of 
whether [an] injury . . . arise[s] out of and in the course of . . . employ-
  
1997)).  The court held the claimant suffered an “accident” because the worsening of 
a pre-existing condition qualifies as a change in pathology.  Id.  Further, the court 
following Drewes determined that walking was an integral part of claimant’s job 
performance and because she was engaged in activities incidental to her work duties 
at the times her knee popped, the injury arose out of employment.  Id. at 531. 
 138. 984 S.W.2d 852 (Mo. 1999) (en banc), superseded by statute, The Workers’ 
Compensation Law, MO. REV. STAT. § 287.020.10 (Supp. 2011).  In Kasl, a manager 
at a residential care facility sought workers’ compensation after she stood up to dis-
pense medicine to a resident and, being unaware her foot had fallen asleep, fell and 
broke her ankle.  Id. at 852.  The court defined non-compensable idiopathic condi-
tions as those unique or innate to the individual.  Id. at 854.  The majority declared, 
however, that “[c]ommon conditions exacerbated by employment requirements are 
not idiopathic.”  Id.  Because claimant’s foot falling asleep was a “common condition 
clearly related to her work[,]” the court affirmed claimant’s award of compensation.  
Id. at 854-55. 
 139. 984 S.W.2d 512 (Mo. 1999) (en banc), superseded by statute, The Workers’ 
Compensation Law, MO. REV. STAT. § 287.020.10 (Supp. 2011). 
 140. MO. REV. STAT. § 287.020.10 (Supp. 2011). 
 141. Drewes, 984 S.W.2d at 515-15. 
 142. Id. at 514. 
 143. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 144. Id. (quoting MO. REV. STAT. § 287.020.5 (1994)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 145. Id. at 514-15. 
 146. Id. at 515. 
 147. Id. 
16
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ment.”148  Thus, following the 2005 amendments, the status of many of the 
common law doctrines employed to satisfy the “arising out of and in the 
course of employment” requirement, including the personal comfort doctrine, 
are unknown.149 
D.  Post-2005 Cases 
Since the 2005 amendments, two cases provide Missouri courts with 
guidance on whether a claimant’s injury arises out of and in the course of 
employment.  In Miller v. Missouri Highway & Transportation Commission, 
the Supreme Court of Missouri upheld the ALJ’s denial of workers’ compen-
sation benefits under the revised statute.150  Miller was employed by the Mis-
souri Highway and Transportation Commission (MHTC), and worked as a 
crew member to repair roads.151  As Miller walked briskly toward a truck to 
get repair materials, he heard his knee pop.152  Following the pop, he felt sig-
nificant pain in his knee, which required a surgery to repair.153  The 
uncontested evidence showed that Miller was walking on an even road sur-
face and “his work did not require him to walk in an unusally brisk way.”154   
Miller’s employer denied his claim for workers’ compensation because 
it found his injury was not work-related.155  The ALJ and Commission agreed 
that Miller failed to produce sufficient evidence that “he suffered a com-
pensable injury as a result of a work-related accident arising out of and in the 
course of his employment.”156  Upon transfer from the Eastern District, the 
Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed.157 
The court reasoned that Miller’s injury was not compensable because “it 
did not arise out of his employment.”158  After summarizing the 2005 revi-
sions, the court clarified that the injury occurred in the course of employment, 
because it happened while Miller was at work, but did not arise out of his 
employment.159  The majority, applying section 287.020.3(2), explained, 
“[a]n injury will not be deemed to arise out of employment if it merely hap-
pened to occur while working but work was not a prevailing factor and the 
  
 148. Johme v. St. John’s Mercy Healthcare, 366 S.W.3d 504, 509 (Mo. 2012) (en 
banc). 
 149. See 29 MISSOURI PRACTICE:  WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW AND PRACTICE, 
supra note 6, § 2.7. 
 150. 287 S.W.3d 671, 674 (Mo. 2009) (en banc). 
 151. Id. at 671-72. 
 152. Id. at 672. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at 674. 
 158. Id. at 673 
 159. Id. 
17
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risk involved – here, walking – is one to which the worker would have been 
exposed equally in normal non-employment life.”160  Although the facts in 
Miller were similar to those in Bennett,161 which allowed recovery where a 
“nurse’s knee ‘popped’ while she walked around a bed [to care for a patient] 
and again when she climbed a flight of stairs”, the court correctly noted that 
Bennett was expressly abrogated by the 2005 statutory revisions.162 
Following Miller, the Southern District adopted a two-step analysis to 
determine whether an injury arises out of and in the course of employment.163  
In Pile v. Lake Regional Health Systems, a nurse turned a corner, stumbled, 
and twisted her ankle and foot while retrieving medicine for a patient.164  The 
nurse sustained a small fracture and was diagnosed with brittle bones in her 
foot, caused by prolonged walking.165  To determine whether the injury arose 
out of and in the course of employment, the court ruled that section 
287.020.3(2) necessitates a two-step analysis.166  The judges explained: 
The first step is to determine whether the hazard or risk is related 
or unrelated to the employment.  Where the activity giving rise to 
the accident and injury is integral to the performance of a worker's 
job, the risk of the activity is related to employment . . . .  Only if 
the hazard or risk is unrelated to the employment does the second 
step of the analysis apply.  In that event, it is necessary to deter-
mine whether the claimant is equally exposed to this hazard or risk 
in normal, non-employment life.167 
Applying the two-step analysis to the facts, the Southern District found 
the nurse’s injury was caused by her excess exposure to walking at work.168  
Because there was a clear nexus between the work-task and the injury, the 
court held it was unnecessary to consider whether she was equally exposed to 
the risk outside of work.169  The court distinguished this case from Miller, 
noting “the risk . . . was not mere walking, but was instead the risk of ten-
donitis due to prolonged walking.”170  Additionally, the judges pointed out 
  
 160. Id. at 674. 
 161. Id. at 673; Bennett v. Columbia Health Care & Rehab., 984 S.W.2d 852 (Mo. 
1999) (en banc), superseded by statute, The Workers’ Compensation Law, MO. REV. 
STAT. § 287.020.10 (Supp. 2011).  The facts of Bennett are more thoroughly dis-
cussed herein.  See supra note 137. 
 162. Miller, 287 S.W.3d at 673-74. 
 163. Pile v. Lake Reg’l Health Sys., 321 S.W.3d 463, 467 (Mo. App. S.D. 2010).  
 164. Id. at 465. 
 165. Id. at 465, 467. 
 166. Id. at 467. 
 167. Id.  
 168. Id. at 468.  
 169. Id. at 467.  
 170. Id. at 468. 
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that, contrary to Pile, Miller did not present any evidence of the cause of his 
injury or the extent he walked at work versus outside of work.171 
Leading to Johme, both Miller and Pile were good law and provided 
courts with guidance on whether an injury arose out of and in the course of 
employment, warranting compensation under workers’ compensation.  
IV.  INSTANT DECISION 
A.  The Majority Opinion 
The Supreme Court of Missouri reversed the Commission’s decision 
awarding workers’ compensation benefits to Johme, finding that Johme failed 
to sufficiently prove her injury arose out of and in the course of her employ-
ment, as required by Missouri Revised Statutes section 287.020.3(2).172 
Because the parties agreed that Johme’s fall in the office was the pre-
vailing factor in causing her injury, subsection (a) of section 287.030.3(2) 
was satisfied and the court focused its attention on subsection (b).173  Subsec-
tion (b) instructs that an injury “shall be deemed to arise out of and in the 
course of the employment only if . . . [it did] not come from a hazard or risk 
unrelated to the employment to which workers would have been equally ex-
posed outside of and unrelated to the employment in normal nonemployment 
life.”174 
Citing their recent decision in Miller, and strictly construing the lan-
guage of the statute, the majority interpreted subsection (b) to mean that a 
claimant must show “a causal connection between the injury at issue and the 
employee’s work activity.”175  If the injury occurred while at work but noth-
ing about work caused the injury, the injury “arose during the course of em-
ployment, but did not arise out of the employment,” and was not recoverable 
under section 287.020.3(2).176  The court reiterated that an “injury is only 
compensable if it is shown to have resulted from a hazard or risk [that] the 
employee would not be equally exposed to in ‘normal non-employment 
life.’”177   
The majority noted that the Commission erred by (1) focusing on what 
Johme was doing when she was injured, rather than what the risk source of 
  
 171. Id.  
 172. Johme v. St. John’s Mercy Healthcare, 366 S.W.3d 504, 505 (Mo. 2012) (en 
banc). 
 173. Id. at 510. 
 174. The Workers’ Compensation Law, MO. REV. STAT. § 287.020.3(2)(b) (Supp. 
2011). 
 175. Johme, 366 S.W.3d at 510. 
 176. Id. at 511 (quoting Miller v. Mo. Highway & Transp. Comm’n, 287 S.W.3d 
671, 674 (Mo. 2009) (en banc)). 
 177. Id. 
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her injury was, and (2) focusing on whether the activity was “incidental to 
employment” rather than “the cause of her injury.”178  Based upon the Com-
mission’s errors and the foregoing analysis, the court reversed the Commis-
sion’s decision.179 
Applying the facts of the case, the court did not find a causal connection 
between the injury at issue (fractured pelvis) and her work activity (making 
coffee).180  Rather, the cause of Johme’s injury was twisting her ankle and 
falling off her shoe.181  Because Johme failed to present any evidence that she 
was exposed to a lesser risk of turning, twisting her ankle, and falling off her 
shoe in her non-employment life than she was while making coffee at work, 
the court determined there was no causal connection between the injury and 
Johme’s work activity.182     
Because Johme’s fall was caused by her shoe rather than her work-
related task of making coffee, and because she was subject to the same risk of 
turning and slipping off her shoe in her non-employment life as she was while 
making coffee in the office kitchen, Johme’s injury had no causal connection 
to her work-related activity and did not warrant compensation under the post-
2005 Missouri chapter on workers’ compensation.183  
B.  The Dissent 
Chief Justice Teitelman dissented on behalf of himself and Judge Pre-
bil.184  The Chief Justice argued that the plain language of section 
287.020.3(2)(b) commands a two-step analysis.185  Under this analysis, he 
stated, “if the risk is related to employment, . . . the equal exposure analysis 
does not apply.”186  The dissenters criticized the majority’s “bright-line dis-
tinction between an injury that merely happens while one is working and an 
injury that is caused by working.”187  Chief Justice Teitelman noted that when 
one is injured while completing a work-related task, the injury and the work-
related task are “inextricably entwined.”188   
Applying their logic, the two justices determined that because Johme 
was injured while completing a work-related task (administering to her per-
  
 178. Id.  
 179. Id. at 512. 
 180. Id. at 511. 
 181. Id.  
 182. Id. The court noted that Johme’s testimony indicating she did not make cof-
fee at home was irrelevant because making coffee was not the risk of her injury – 
slipping off her shoe was.  Id. at 511 n.12. 
 183. Id. at 511-512. 
 184. Id. at 512 (Teitelman, C.J., dissenting). 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. 
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sonal comfort), “her injury resulted from a work-related risk.”189  Because 
Johme’s injury arose from a work-related risk, there was no need to deter-
mine whether she was equally exposed to the risk in her non-employment 
life, and she was entitled to recover under section 287.020.3(2).190 
The dissenters warned that the majority’s rule would prevent other sed-
entary workers from recovering under workers’ compensation for injuries 
resulting from work-related tasks, and hinted that the majority’s analysis was 
overly restrictive.191  
V.  COMMENT  
Though Johme was a relatively straightforward case, its holding signifi-
cantly impacts current workers’ compensation law in several ways.  First, 
Johme eliminates the personal comfort doctrine as an absolute tool for recov-
ery for workplace injuries.  Second, the court’s opinion clarifies the “arising 
out of and in the course of employment” requirement after the 2005 revisions 
by reinforcing Miller and implicitly criticizing the Pile test.  Finally, Johme 
introduces budding concerns into the structure of Missouri’s workers’ com-
pensation system by potentially departing from the system’s original purpose. 
A.   Personal Comfort Doctrine 
After Johme, employees can no longer rely on the personal comfort doc-
trine to guarantee recovery under workers’ compensation.  Although Mis-
souri’s high court did not directly address or explicitly abrogate the personal 
comfort doctrine, the court’s analysis significantly limited it.192  The personal 
comfort doctrine states that activities tending to personal comfort are inciden-
tal to employment, but Johme clarified, “it is not enough that an employee’s 
injury occurs while doing something related to or incidental to the em-
ployee’s work . . . .”193  Thus, contrary to prior court applications, the per-
sonal comfort doctrine acts only as a tool to show that the injury occurred 
while the employee was acting in the course of employment, or while fulfill-
ing duties of employment.  The claimant must separately satisfy the arising 
out of employment standard.194  
  
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. at 512-13. 
 191. Id. at 513. 
 192. See Thomas D. Billam, “Personal Comfort Doctrine” is Gone in Missouri, 
WALLACE SAUNDERS (June 7, 2012), http://www.wallacesaunders.com/Reso 
urces/image/PDFs/legal%20alerts/Personal%20Comfort%20Doctrine%20in%20Miss
ouri%20Work%20Comp%20is%20Gone.pdf.  
 193. Johme, 366 S.W.3d at 511. 
 194. This approach to the personal comfort doctrine is accepted in other state 
courts.  See generally, Kinnebrew v. Little John’s Truck, Inc., 989 S.W.2d 541 (Ark. 
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The court’s elimination of the personal comfort doctrine as a theory of 
absolute recovery is consistent with the 2005 amendments.  Three details 
provide support for the foregoing assertion.  First, the legislature removed the 
vague “incidental to employment” language from the statute,195 which formed 
the basis for the personal comfort doctrine.196  The definition of a com-
pensable injury in Missouri Revised Statutes section 287.020.3 now focuses 
on the risk of the injury and the risk’s relation to the employment rather than 
whether the injury is “incidental to employment.”197  Accordingly, absolute 
recovery for injuries that occurred while tending to a personal comfort, with-
out further proof of the risk of the injury, would sweep too broadly.   
Second, the legislature enacted Missouri Revised Statutes section 
287.020.10,198 which expressly abrogates the use of the terms “arising out of” 
and “in the course” of employment as used in Drewes v. TWA.199  In Drewes, 
the Supreme Court of Missouri employed the personal comfort doctrine to 
satisfy the “arising out of employment” requirement.200  Because Drewes 
used the personal comfort doctrine to assess the “arising out of” analysis, and 
because section 287.020.10 disavows the term “arising out of” as used in 
Drewes, Johme is consistent with the amended statute because both disallow 
the personal comfort doctrine analysis to affect the “Arising out of” require-
ment.  Finally, by limiting recovery under the personal comfort doctrine to 
acts ministering to personal comfort that also create an increased risk of the 
resulting injury, the court’s decision will reduce fraud and the number of ap-
plicants entitled to recover, thereby reducing costs for employer’s workers’ 
compensation insurance.  These outcomes are consistent with the purposes 
cited for the 2005 revisions. 
In sum, the personal comfort doctrine survives only as a means to show 
that an employee remained in the course of employment while attending to 
his or her personal comfort.  To completely satisfy the “arising out of and in 
  
Ct. App. 1999); Mason v. Lake Dolores Grp., LLC, 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d 914 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2004); Miedema v Dial Corp., 551 N.W.2d 309 (Iowa 1996); Losinski v. Drs. 
Corcoran, Barkoff & Stagnone, P.A., 636 P.2d 898 (N.M. Ct. App. 1981). 
 195. See The Workers’ Compensation Law, MO. REV. STAT. § 287.020.3 (Supp. 
2011).  The definition of injury previously stated that “[t]he injury must be incidental 
to and not independent of the relation of employer and employee.”  See MO. REV. 
STAT. § 287.020.3(1) (2000) (amended 2005).  One of the former requirements for an 
injury to arise out of and in the course of employment was, that “[i]t can be seen to 
have followed as a natural incident of the work.”  Id. § 287.020.3(2)(b). 
 196. See, e.g., Jones v. Bendix Corp., 407 S.W.2d 650, 652-53 (Mo. App. W.D. 
1966). 
 197. See MO. REV. STAT. § 287.020.3 (Supp. 2011). 
 198. Worker’s Compensation, 2005 Mo. Laws 907. 
 199. See MO. REV. STAT. § 287.020.10 (Supp. 2011). 
 200. Drewes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 984 S.W.2d 512, 514 (Mo. 1999) (en 
banc), superseded by statute, MO. REV. STAT. § 287.020.10 (Supp. 2011). 
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the course of employment” requirement that is necessary to receive workers’ 
compensation, further proof is required. 
B.  “Arising Out of and in the Course of Employment” Requirement 
In Johme, the Supreme Court of Missouri provided the lower courts, 
Commission, and ALJs with further guidance on whether an injury arises out 
of and in the course of employment.201  By reinforcing its decision in Miller 
and implicitly revising the Pile analysis, the court clarified what a claimant 
must prove in order to recover under workers’ compensation and illustrated 
the impact of the 2005 statutory revisions.202   
Significantly, the court in Johme solidified its reasoning in Miller con-
cerning the “arising out of and in the course of employment” requirement.203  
These two recent decisions from the state’s highest court will provide strong 
precedent for future workers’ compensation claims.  To satisfy Missouri Re-
vised Statutes section 287.020.3(2), Miller and Johme instruct that a claimant 
must show a causal connection between the work activity and the injury.204  
To recover, the claimant must prove the injury was caused by a peculiar risk 
or an increased risk associated with the employment.205  The focus should be 
on the risk of the employee’s injury rather than the employee’s work activ-
ity.206 
The court’s focus on risk rather than activity has important implications 
for the Pile analysis.207  The Pile test asserts that where the activity giving 
rise to the accident is integral to the performance of the worker’s job, the risk 
  
 201. See Johme v. St. John’s Mercy Healthcare, 366 S.W.3d 504, 509-10 (Mo. 
2012) (en banc). 
 202. See generally James B. Kennedy, The Supreme Court Speaks!, EVANS DIXON 
(May 31, 2012), http://www.evans-dixon.com/article-detail.aspx?article=1023 
&articlegroup=. 
 203. Id.; Chris T. Archer, Workers’ Compensation, MO. BAR, http://www 
.mobar.org/pub3col-courtbulletin.aspx?id=5865 (last visited Feb. 4, 2013). 
 204. Johme, 366 S.W.3d at 510; Miller v. Mo. Highway & Transp. Comm’n, 287 
S.W.3d 671, 674 (Mo. 2009) (en banc). 
 205. See, e.g., Bennett v. Columbia Health Care, 80 S.W.3d 524, 531 (Mo. App. 
W.D. 2002), superseded by statute, MO. REV. STAT. § 287.020.10 (Supp. 2011).  See 
generally 1 ARTHUR LARSON, LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW §§ 3.02–
3.03 (2002).  A “peculiar risk” means the “risk is particular to the claimant’s occupa-
tion.”  Bennett, 80 S.W.3d at 531.  An “increased risk” means the particular “claim-
ant’s employment led to an increase in the risk or hazard which resulted in the in-
jury[.]”  Id. 
 206. Johme, 366 S.W.3d at 511. 
 207. While this paragraph discusses the differences between the majority in Jo-
hme and the Pile test, the asserted disagreement is limited only to the stated Pile as-
sertion.  While the court in Johme did not address the structure of Pile’s two-step 
analysis, it is likely a useful tool for assessing the arising out of and in the course of 
employment requirement under section 287.020.3(2). 
23
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of the activity is related to employment and there is no need to address “step 
two” equal exposure.208  While Johme does not explicitly address Pile, the 
majority’s analysis clearly disagrees with this assertion.209  For example, the 
majority opinion states: 
[I]t is not enough that an employee’s injury occurs while doing 
something related to or incidental to the employee’s work; rather, 
the employee’s injury is only compensable if it is shown to have 
resulted from a hazard or risk to which the employee would not be 
equally exposed in “normal nonemployment life.”210   
Further evidence of the majority’s disapproval of Pile is apparent in the 
dissenting opinion, which supports and employs the Pile analysis.211 
Combining these changes to the “arising out of and in the course of em-
ployment” requirement with the fact that claimants carry the burden of proof 
in workers’ compensation cases means certain employees will now have a 
more difficult time recovering for injuries on the job.212  The burden for em-
ployees injured by risks peculiar to their employment will be the same; the 
employee will simply have to show he or she was injured while engaged in 
the activity.213  For all other claimants to establish his or her injury arose out 
of employment, the claimant must now present evidence as to the risk of the 
injury and the likelihood of non-employment exposure to that risk.  These 
additional elements of proof, together with the 2005 statutory mandate that 
judges view evidence impartially, substantially heighten employees’ burden 
of proof in workers’ compensation claims. 
  
 208. Pile v. Lake Reg’l Health Sys., 321 S.W.3d 463, 467 (Mo. App. S.D. 2010). 
 209. See Archer, supra note 203. 
 210. Johme, 366 S.W.3d at 511. 
 211. Id. at 512 (Teitelman, C.J., dissenting) (“In other words, the principal opin-
ion draws a bright-line distinction between an injury that merely happens while one is 
working and an injury that is caused by working. This distinction is not convincing 
when, as in this case, the injury occurs during the performance of a work-related task. 
The work-related task and the injury are inextricably entwined. The fact that the in-
jury occurred while one is working is, in most cases, the necessary factual predicate 
for showing that the injury is work-related.”). 
 212. Kristen Frasch, Worker’s Coffee-Making Injury Not Compensable, HUMAN 
RESOURCE EXECUTIVE ONLINE BLOG (July 12, 2012), http://blog.hreonline.com 
/2012/07/12/workers-coffee-making-injury-not-compensable/ (discussing the state-
ment of Merrily Archer of EEO Legal Solutions, who noted a reduction in the number 
of idiopathic injuries and other health crises covered under workers’ compensation). 
 213. This is the likely the “hazard or risk [related] to employment” under section 
287.020.3(2)(b); in other words, an “occupational risk” as opposed to a “neutral risk.”  
See The Workers’ Compensation Law, MO. REV. STAT. § 287.020.3(2)(b) (Supp. 
2011).  An example of this situation might be an injury occurring from the use of rare, 
toxic chemicals in a science laboratory. 
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Following Johme, the “arising out of and in the course of” requirement 
also has certain practical implications for employers and employees following 
a workplace injury.214  In the investigation process, employers should gather 
as many details as possible to show the injury did not arise out of the em-
ployee’s employment.  For example, details such as what the employee was 
wearing, the condition of the environment, and how the injury occurred will 
be critical pieces of information.  Additionally, both employers and employ-
ees should carefully draft accident reports following the injury.  The words 
used to describe the accident may be crucial to the court’s determination of 
the risk involved.  For example, in Johme, the employer’s report stating Jo-
hme twisted her ankle and fell off her shoe was vital in the court’s holding 
that the risk did not arise out of and in the course of employment.215  
C.  Potential Concerns 
Although workers’ compensation was created to apply only to injuries 
“arising out of and in the course of . . . employment,”216 and the statute does 
not prohibit common law negligence suits for claims falling outside the rights 
and remedies provided by the statute,217 critics remain concerned that the 
requirements of Johme and the 2005 amendments will lead to a destruction of 
the workers’ compensation system.218   
One criticism of Johme is that it introduces fault back into the workers’ 
compensation system.219  At its establishment, the purpose of workers’ com-
pensation was to allow employees to recover for work-related injuries without 
having to prove fault or face common law defenses such as assumption or 
risk or contributory negligence.220  Under Johme, the burden to establish a 
compensable injury is increasingly stringent; an employee is now required to 
prove causation and present evidence that he or she was exposed to a greater 
risk of the injury at work than outside of work.221  In other words, an em-
  
 214. Christopher D. Vanderbeek, Missouri Supreme Court Limits What Consti-
tutes an Accidental Injury in Work Comp, DANNA MCKITRICK (June 14, 2012), 
http://www.dannamckitrick.com/articles/2012/06/missouri-supreme-court-limits-
what-constitutes-an-accidental-injury-in-work-comp/; Mo. Comp. News:  Adjusting to 
Johme, ASK ARCHER (July 2012), http://www.askarcher.com/jul_2012_comp 
_news.pdf. 
 215. Johme, 366 S.W.3d at 506. 
 216. MO. REV. STAT. § 287.120.1 (Supp. 2011). 
 217. Id. § 287.120.2; Mo. Alliance for Retired Ams. v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus. 
Relations, 277 S.W.3d 670, 680 (Mo. 2009) (en banc). 
 218. See Yoder, supra note 59, at 1093-94; Frasch, supra note 212. 
 219. Frasch, supra note 212. 
 220. Bass v. Nat’l Super Mkts., Inc., 911 S.W.2d 617, 619 (Mo. 1995) (en banc). 
 221. See Johme v. St. John’s Mercy Healthcare, 366 S.W.3d 504, 510 (Mo. 2012) 
(en banc). 
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ployee must now prove the employer created the risk or an increased risk of 
injury, as opposed to something or someone else.   
This idea appears akin to the pre-workers’ compensation common law, 
which “permitted an injured employee to recover for work-related injuries 
only if he or she could prove that the accident resulted solely from the em-
ployer’s negligence.”222  Prior to Johme, the court focused on a more neutral 
standard – whether the employee was engaged in a work-related activity 
when injured.223  If the employee was engaged in an activity incidental to 
employment, the injury was assumed to arise out of and in the course of em-
ployment.224  Following Johme, critics may say an employee is required to 
show the employer failed to provide a reasonable duty of care by creating the 
risk.  Thus, one may argue fault-based analysis re-enters the realm of work-
place injuries.  For example, an employment litigation practitioner, warns: 
If we go down that road, we’ve compromised a system set up to 
care for workers without regarding [sic] to fault or principles of 
negligence.  And, what will carriers do with this decision, but in-
creasingly deny claims on this basis and again, muck up a no-fault 
compensation system with negligence principles?  As public pol-
icy, this precedent presents a danger to workers (no pun in-
tended).225 
A second potential critique of Johme is that constricting the scope of 
what satisfies the “arising out of and in the course of employment” require-
ment significantly limits the number of injuries falling under workers’ com-
pensation.226  By limiting the injuries compensable under the system, em-
ployees may attempt to seek common law negligence remedies for these 
workplace injuries.227  If successful, these awards could result in substantial 
  
 222. Bass, 911 S.W.2d at 619. 
 223. See, e.g., Pile v. Lake Reg’l Health Sys., 321 S.W.3d 463, 467 (Mo. App. 
S.D. 2010). 
 224. Id.; see also Kunce v. Junge Baking Co., 432 S.W.2d 602, 609 (Mo. App. 
S.D. 1968).  But cf. Billam, supra at note 192 (“In my opinion, this is a terrible analy-
sis:  the definition of ‘related’ is way too vague to assist anyone = [sic] it in effect 
would remove the ‘arising out of’ requirement and deem compensable any situa-
tion/accident that would occur ‘in the course of’ employment, because there would 
always be an argument that if Employer ‘allowed’ such things to occur, then by golly 
these things ‘must be ‘related’ to work.’”). 
 225. Frasch, supra note 212. 
 226. See generally, Mo. Alliance for Retired Ams. v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus. 
Relations, 277 S.W.3d 670, 678 (Mo. 2009) (en banc) (arguing the narrowed defini-
tion of “injury” under section 287.020.3 excludes a substantial number of employees 
from workers’ compensation). 
 227. See id. at 680 (“It therefore is adjudged, decreed and declared that workers 
excluded from the act by the narrower definitions of ‘accident’ and ‘injury’ have a 
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litigation costs, large liability payments, and insurance obstacles for employ-
ers. 228  The increased availability of a common law remedy undermines the 
purpose and bargain established by the workers’ compensation system, which 
was to avoid common law negligence suits.229   
Moving forward, courts and practitioners will increasingly have to ad-
dress the issue of whether the 2005 amendments and Johme’s “arising out of 
and in the course of employment” requirement lead to a destruction of the 
workers’ compensation system in Missouri.  
VI.  CONCLUSION  
Following Johme, employees have a significant burden to establish their 
injuries arose out of and in the course of employment, entitling them to work-
ers’ compensation benefits.  Workers in the position of Johme can no longer 
rely on the personal comfort doctrine as a “short-cut” to guarantee recovery.  
Instead, a claimant must show the injury occurred in the course of employ-
ment and the risk that led to the injury was work-related (either a peculiar risk 
or an increased risk).230   
Future claimants may argue Johme’s strict statutory interpretation desta-
bilizes the workers’ compensation system by introducing fault back into the 
system and restructuring the employer-employee bargain.  Others may con-
tend the Johme decision is too “employer friendly.”  Whether it is necessary 
to revert back to the prior scope of injuries covered under the workers’ com-
pensation statute, however, is likely a matter for the legislative process.  The 
high court’s interpretation of the revised workers’ compensation statute in 
Johme appears rational and its holding is consistent with the legislative pur-
pose for the amendments. 
 
  
right to bring suit under the common law, just as they could and did prior to the initial 
adoption of the act, because they no longer fall within the exclusivity provision of the 
act as set out in section 287.120.”). 
 228. See Wil Tomlinson, Client Alert: A New Hole in Missouri Workers’ Com-
pensation Protection, ARMSTRONG TEASDALE, http://www.armstrongteasdale.com 
/Marketing/ClientAlert-Email/CA_March-2-09.htm  (last visited Feb. 5, 2013). 
 229. Bass v. Nat’l Super Mkts., Inc., 911 S.W.2d 617, 619 (Mo. 1995) (“The 
statutory contract provided a means of compensating the injured worker that, with 
exceptions, eliminated the common law’s concerns with negligence and fault alto-
gether”). 
 230. Johme v. St. John’s Mercy Healthcare, 366 S.W.3d 504, 511 (Mo. 2012) (en 
banc); see 1 LARSON, supra note 205, at §§ 3.02-3.03. 
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